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The Civilised Self and the Barbaric 
Other: imperial delusions of order and 




ABSTRACT   In the aftermath of the military conflicts of 1936 -45, there seemed to 
be a global renunciation of war as an instrument of state policy. Shortly 
thereafter , however , decades of ideological attrition between the major powers 
and the inherent perversion of postcolonial states reduced the solemn 
declarations of 1945 to ineffectual rhetoric. Underpinning the decline and 
demise of a human-centred approach to global peace and security is the 
enduring notion of the civilised self and the barbaric other. The polarisation of 
humanity between camps of the savage and the civilised has continued to 
animate international policy making despite denials. This paper argues that a 




In Collective Insecurity, 1 I examined the changing character of collective 
security in post-cold war Africa. I argued that both international institutions 
and the hypocrisy of powerful states have combined to encourage and abet 
the tyrannical capture of many African states and the reduction of several of 
them to pathetic sites for the egregious abuse of millions of people. Further, I 
posited that the reduction of several postcolonial states to 'geographies of 
injustice', 2 especially in the cold war era, was a consequence of the prevailing 
militarised concept of security. In the past decade, however, a careful 
observer of contemporary world order would clearly see the re-emergence of 
a militarised concept of security . 
Events in Afghanistan and Iraq evidence a return of a militarised concept 
of state security. A troubling aspect of this phenomenon is the revitalisation 
of the omperialistic notion of the barbaric other and the civilised self. By this 
logic the former is depicted as anarchic, primitive and in need of 'pacification ' 
and civilisation. The process of pacification and civilisation often involves 
military attacks and vilification of those believed to be uncivilised. Embedded 
in this narrative is the belief that the 'savage' peoples of the global South,3 a 
diverse bloc of peoples, cultures and societies, are a menace and a threat to 
global peace. 
From this prism complex and problematic issues such as international 
terrorism, 4 Israeli -Palestinian conflict, 5 militant Islam,6 proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction,7 epidemics and pandemics, 8 and state failure 
are peculiarly construed as emanating from the 'anarchic', 'theocratic' and 
'undeveloped' global South. In this binary conception of global security, the 
cause, location and site of resolving growing threats to global security are 
fixed in the global South. The metaphor of the global North as the 
overworked nanny, constantly at pains to supervise the 'development' of a 
delinquent, infantilised group of peoples, 9 is one that has for centuries 
underpinned so-called North -South relations. 10 
Entwined in the praxis of this metaphor is the brutalisation of the 'savage' 
by the 'civilised'. The 'burden of taming the savages' entails a persistent 
pattern of brutality and imperialism. This process is historically evidenced in 
European colonialism and iterated in contemporary narratives of a 'violent 
Islamic world'. It is a process that has mutated over time while retaining its 
imperialistic essence. Inspired by certain ideological fundamentalisms and 
unyielding certitude, the cycle and pattern of a civilised self and a barbaric 
 
other is repeatedly re-enacted by colonialism, cultural imperialism, military 
depredations, and an unrelenting political and economic interference in the 
domestic affairs of the global South.11 
In this paper I explore the metaphor of the civilised self and the savage 
other in the context of the emerging concept of human security. I interrogate 
the notion that the global South is the cause and origin of contemporary 
global insecurity. My thesis is that the North and South are mutually 
vulnerable, sharing a common destiny, which cannot be realised unless 
notions of a civilised self and a barbaric other are abandoned. 
My analysis also questions the complicity and abetment of some scholars 
devoted to ideological certitudes of free market economies and Western-style 
democracy as a universal panacea for political and economic problems in the 
South. Of course, there are normative virtues in liberal philosophy which are 
indispensable for civilised existence. However, the history of the relations 
between the 'civilised self and the 'barbaric other' reveals a common and 
persistent pattern of domination of the 'barbaric' by the 'civilised', who 
nonetheless profess liberal ideals. The paradox, thus, is that the brutalisation of 
the 'savage' by the 'civilised' is a cause and effect of the civilising mission 
inherent in the certitudes, assumptions and dogmas of Western-style liberalism, 
persuaded by itself of the universality and superiority of its own habits, 
convictions and historical experiences. 
My analysis is animated by theoretical approaches favoured by the Third 
World Approaches to International law (TWAIL). 12 Structurally and 
thematically this paper is divided into three parts. The first introduces the 
binary concept of civilisation, its influence on colonialism and state security. 
Colonialism and empire are explicated, not as epochs in human history but as 
radical and ongoing structural reconfigurations of the globe. The second part 
examines the limitations of the classical concept of state security and the 
emergence of the concept of human security. Part three scrutinizes the abuse 
and misuse of certain basic tenets of neoliberalism, such as democracy, human 
rights and free market systems, as apologia for the evisceration of human 
dignity in the global South. I argue that the perversion of neoliberal values 
of human dignity and freedom constitutes a threat to human security across 
the globe. 
 
The civilised self and the barbaric other 
Cultural chauvinism is nothing new and notions of the civilised self and the 
barbaric other are ancient. But the worrying aspect of this phenomenon is the 
brutalisation  that the 'civilised' inflicts on the 'savage' in the name of 
enlightening and pacifying the latter. The savagery inherent in the civilisin5 
mission stretches from the ridiculous Taliban obsession with lengthy beards 1 
as a shibboleth of piety, to the genocide of the American natives by European 
imperialists. 14 
Indeed, a notion of the civilised self and the barbaric other underpins the 
infamous North -South divide. The global North, 15 often described as the 
'developed', 'advanced' countries of the world, is often contrasted with the 
'developing countries', or Third World' nations of the world. 16 The totalising 
impact of a shared history of extreme European colonialism and depredation 
 
in the past half millennium is often used as a touchstone in banding together a 
huge array of complexities. 17 
Modern history is filled with various forms of colonialism and conquest 
inspired by cultural chauvinism and economic exploitation, but none has 
been as violent and enduring in its radical transformation of the globe as 
European colonialism 18 in the global South. Imperial Europe adopted a 
religious and geopolitical campaign that bifurcated the world into a civilised 
Europe and a savage 'other'. This oppositional logic was the anchor for the 
unprecedented dispossession and genocide of colonised peoples and 
territories. 19 
To be regarded as 'civilized', the 'savage' is required to imbibe and 
reproduce Eurocentric norms, values and institutions. As Makau Wa Mutua 
notes, within this prevailing logic of colonialism, 'history is a linear, 
unidirectional progression with the "superior" and "scientific" Western 
civilisation leading and paving the way for others to follow' .20 In its totalising 
mission colonialism rarely roused itself to acknowledge the multitude of 
differences among peoples and cultures of the global South.21 
European colonialism 22 did not countenance or acknowledge the 
complexity and diversity of the Islamic worlds.23 Imperial Europe 
surveyed the complexity and diversity of Islamic peoples and summed them 
all into one: a barbarous, stagnant, heathen and vile brood. This process, the 
birth of Orientalism in 1095,24 summoned Europe to the first crusade 
against the 'enemies of God'. As Richard Falk has presciently observed, in 
such dualist conception, Islam was portrayed by scholarly discourse as an 
unchanging essence that can only produce uniformly oppressive political 
arrangements. In contrast, the 'Western mind is uniquely positioned as 
rational and coherent'.25 
Orientalism seems to endure forever. Current rhetoric on the so-called 
'Islamic mind', or 'Arab mind',26 as captured in the works of people like 
Samuel Huntington, reflects an uncritical acceptance of a totalising narrative 
of the civilised self and the barbaric other. In the so-called 'clash of 
civilisations' the Islamic world was often depicted 'as a monolithic and 
unitary structure, opposed to all that was modern and irremediably autocratic 
in state/society relations'. In recent times this binary logic has inspired 
the narrative that current spasms of violence by some disaffected Islamic 
militants is the product of 'Islam's failed encounter with modernity'! Once 
the depiction of the 'savage other' as an unruly horde is completed, the 
'civilised self justifies its brutalisation of the former as a heaven-ordained 
task of pacification and civilisation.27 This mission, often backed with 
tremendous violence, is uniquely construed as an unavoidable task of 
creating order from the chaotic environment of the savage. To achieve this 
objective, international law and institutions were often summoned to the 
service of power and empire. International law could not have served 
imperialism well if it did not share and reflect the ethos, philosophies, 
temperament and delusions of empire.28 
Having dispossessed the natives of the so-called 'backward territories' 29 of 
their lands, resources and cultures, the colonial powers proceeded to carve up 
the colonised territories. The resulting colonial states were brutal in their 
 
exploitation of the colonised. To maintain 'order' in the colonies, the 
'civilised self had to rely on a militaristic concept of state security. As long as 
there were no direct military conflicts between states, the misery of the 
colonised was never considered to be a matter of state security. Thus the 
history of state formation in the global South, especially in Africa and in 
the Middle East,30 holds the key to an understanding of the degraded nature 
of state security in those territories. 31 
Imperialism required the sustenance of non-democratic political entities in 
the colonised territories and the economic humiliation of the colonised.32 At 
the dawn of political independence many newly decolonised states were 
deliberately looted and impoverished. In some cases monarchs were created 
overnight. As outposts of empire many colonial states33 were mere conduit 
pipes for the transfer of resources to the imperial metropolis. Peace of the 
graveyard was mistaken for peace! 
Why did such a denuded concept of humanity survive for so long? Three 
interrelated factors may be posited. First, colonial states were creatures of a 
world order fashioned on the Westphalian paradigm, with its rigid deference 
to the canons of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. 
Second, colonial states lacked local institutions for the humane and 
legitimate regulation of power. Third, the prevailing praxis of state security 
did not encompass 'the development of human dignity and basic rights'. 
At the formal end of colonialism the first generation of rulers in many 
postcolonial states tended to perpetuate the militarised concept of state 
security to secure their tenuous hold on power. Effective control over the 
newly 'decolonised' territories became a licence to pillage the state and 
oppress the citizenry. In addition, cold war politics afforded ample shield from 
critical external gaze. The rule of 'big men' and thugs converted colonies 
into personal fiefdoms. 
The brutalisation of the citizenry was often justified on the spurious and 
nebulous grounds of 'state security' and the alleged need to maintain 'peace 
and stability' in the state. The maxim salus populi suprema lex (the safety of 
the people is the supreme law) was widely invoked by dictators and tyrants to 
justify the enslavement of people. By an adroit mixture of coercion and 
corruption of the domestic order and deft manipulation of the international 
security paradigm, tyrants held sway in their respective domestic domains. The 
impoverishment of the concept of security through perverted methods could 
not have succeeded without the active connivance of powerful states and 
institutions. 
Special attention must be paid to the self-serving and wicked foreign 
policies of imperial powers and the impact of such policies of global 
security. The defunct Soviet Union, for example, engaged in systematic 
brutality, widespread atrocities and the ruthless suppression of independent 
thought in Eastern Europe. Similarly, the USA engaged in what it 
characterised as 'low intensity conflict', a euphemism for the gradual, 
systematic and sustained destruction of regimes and peoples opposed to its 
policies across the world. In Nicaragua, for example, President Reagan 
once described the bandit Contras as 'the moral equivalent of our 
Founding Fathers'. 34 
 
In the name of spreading democracy and a free market economy the 
USA has supported and in many cases installed right-wing military 
dictatorships in the global South. French and Belgian troops were 
routinely dispatched to prop up tyrants in Africa. Millions of peoples in 
the global South have perished as a result of US-supported aggression, 
policies and terrorism in postcolonial territories. 
The militarised concept of security is also evidenced by the arms race 
during the Cold War. With 702 military installations throughout the world in 
132 countries, the USA possesses 8000 active and operational nuclear 
warheads (2000 of which are on hair trigger alert, ready to be launched 
with 15 minutes warning), thousands of chemical and biological 
warheads, thousands of military aircraft, and hundreds of battle-ready 
warships. With such a deadly arsenal, the question remains whether the 
world is necessarily a secure place. 
 
Collective security: the limits of armed force 
The concept of collective security is premised on the notion that 'peace 
is universal and indivisible'.35 In its classical formulation, collective 
security purports that an alliance of states with similar values and 
interests is a reliable bulwark against unilateral aggression.36 Collective 
insecurity operates on the idea that the presence of an overwhelming 
collective military force operating in a multilateral framework is a deterrent 
to errant unilateral aggression. 37 The Wilsonian ideal of a 'universal 
government of all states' never really saw the light of day.38 Nevertheless, 
the carnage39 in the so-called world wars40 persuaded many states that 
global security was best secured through  a multilateral  regime.  Inasmuch  
as the  notion  of peace  was construed to be the absence of war, the UN 
Charter acknowledged the relationship between state security and human 
dignity.41 More importantly, the UN Charter underscored the limitations of a 
unilateral pursuit of security and in its stead sought to institutionalise a 
regime of collective security with some focus on the human aspects of 
security.42 
Although collective security transcends global machineries for enforced 
compliance with international law, the imperatives of international justice, 
rule of law and opportunity to live a fulfilled life43 were largely sacrificed at 
the altar of cold war politics. However, whether one subscribes to the views 
of the interdependence theorists44 or to those of the neo-institutionalists, it 
was becoming increasingly clear, especially in the aftermath of the Cold War, 
that security could no longer be limited to preparation for war.45 Thus the 
end of the Cold War inspired a movement towards a rethinking of the 
militarised concept of security.46 
The intimations of a Grotian moment in the mid-1980s47 questioned some 
of the fundamentalisms of the Cold War. Some global problems such as 
terrorism (international and state-sponsored), drug trafficking, organised 
crime, environmental degradation, and unfair trade practices and policies 
were increasingly recognised as threats to international peace and security.48 
The militaristic conception of security, particularly in an age when the most 
 
dangerous threats to security require holistic approaches,49 became ineffectual, 
if not anachronistic,50 in the face of such global issues. If security had to be 
meaningful, 51 its definition and praxis had to appreciate the imRortance of the 
individual human, both as a subject and an object of security. 2 
The centring of the individual at the core of security is captured under the 
emerging concept of human security, 53 a term most often associated with the 
1994 Human Development Report on Human Security54 by Mahbub ul Haq. 
Although the 1994 report has been credited with giving prominence to the 
concept of human security, a human-centred conct of security is immanent 
in the various international instruments preceding formation of the United 
Nations. Instruments such as the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Genocide Convention and the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and their Additional Protocols make allusions to human security.56 The 1994 
report identifies four essential characteristics of human security, namely, 
universality, interdependence, prevention and anthropocentricity of 
security.57 The sovereignty of the human being is inescapable. A caution 
must be added here. Bodily soverenty cannot always be equated with human 
security.58 Human security5  describes some balance between the need for 
safety and the necessity of freedom. Absolutism in respect of either safety or 
freedom would be naive and useless. 
Threats to human security may be direct or indirect in their origins. Efforts 
geared towards a systemic approach to organising these conceptualisations 
into a coherent structure of international security underscore the theoretical 
complexity of the concept of human security.60 Although human security is a 
noble idea,61 the question remains whether the concept has any constructive 
impact on the behaviour or policies of states. Secondly, how is human security to 
be realised in an era when governments use fear of terrorism as a policy of 
choice?62 
 
The constructivist impact of human security 
The international order on peace and security is not short of grand and noble 
ideas that died on the vine. There are several noble concepts that states 
ostensibly celebrate but which are rarely applied or adopted in their policies. 
Human security is a concept that most states would give rhetorical approval 
to but of whose meaning few have a clear idea, let alone knowing how it 
would be implemented. A potential drawback in the unwieldiness of the 
concept of human security is the arbitrariness of choice that its vagueness 
offers potential admirers. With the notable exceptions of Canada and Japan, 
no state has articulated its foreign policy in the light of this theoretical 
paradigm shift. 
Human security is part of the more general project of global governance, 
with all the attendant contradictions, challenges and trepidations. Is human 
security constructive and how best could it be operationalised? In teasing 
out the answers to this question, four main aspects of the concept of 
human security must be considered: state violence, environmental 
degradation, population displacement and globalisation. Bearing these four 
factors in mind, there are three main approaches to the constructivism and 
 
implementation of human security. Each approach reflects a dimension of 
human security. These dimensions are freedom from fear or rather, the safety 
of the individual; guarantee of human rights and rule of law; freedom from 
poverty; and the institutionalisation of social justice. 63 
The first dimension, indeed a school of thought on human security, 
conceives of human security broadly enough to encompass the rule of law 
and international treaties, and multilateralism as vectors for restoring 
human security. Needless to say, this approach is neoliberal and may be 
construed as an extension of Kantian democratic peace. 64 On a slight 
different level the construction of human security from the building blocks 5 
of human rights is premised on three related mechanisms, namely, 
sanctioning, shaming, and co-optation of deviant states into the family of 
nations.66 Both approaches are constructive. They both rely on group 
sanctions to correct and restrain deviant states. Sanctions and similar group 
rebukes confine or limit the ability of the deviant to access goods, services 
and capital markets until such a time when the deviant behaviour has been 
sufficiently modified. 
This method of implementing human security is effective only if the elites 
in the offending state are vulnerable enough to international services, goods 
and capital markets to impel them to adopt prescribed normative changes. It 
is ineffective when the errant state is a powerful entity driven by its own 
permutations of good and evil and impervious to group rebuke. Effective 
shaming or rebuke relies on a group's shared sense of outrage and values. 
The assumption here is that there is a body of acceptable modes of behaviour 
to which  all states, regardless  of their historical  and contemporary 
experiences have subscribed. What happens when the errant state is 
unabashedly proud of its deviant status? Or when the group is polarised 
on North -South lines? 
Again, there is an assumption that all states have an equal sense of shame. 
Where such assumption is untenable, misplaced or exaggerated, deviations 
from acceptable norms induce little or no shame to the offending states. 
Indeed, as in the case of the US invasion of Iraq, such errant behaviour could 
metamorphose into patriotic fervour! Similarly, co-optation relies on a 
complex system of 'verification' whereby the behaviour of offending states on 
human rights is routinely checked and evaluated.67 The problem with this 
approach is that in most cases the 'civilised self performs the task of 
evaluating the behaviour of the 'barbaric other'. Biases and inconsistencies in 
the evaluations are bound to occur. For example, while North Korea and 
Iran have been condemned for their nuclear ambitions, Pakistan and Israel, 
two notorious nuclear powers, have escaped rebuke. Such inconsistency 
undermines human security. 
The second dimension to human security is the humanitarian aspect, with a 
focus on the safety of the individual, especially in the event of war. This 
approach is institutionalised by the establishment of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, and humanitarian treaties such as the Hague 
Conventions regarding the laws of war. By creating a normative regime for 
the conduct of war, the humanitarian approach underscores the safety of the 
individual as a tenet of civilisation. The profound impact of this approach is 
 
the outlawry of war itself as an instrument of national policy. Two additional 
concepts, namely, peace maintenance and conflict prevention, have been 
perceived as instruments of human security. Peacekeeping, peace building and 
humanitarian assistance are logical extensions of this dimension of human 
security. 
The third and perhaps most problematic aspect of human security is 
individual sustainable development. This approach focuses on non-military 
factors that threaten human security and survival. This aspect of human 
security is heterogeneous, taking into account population explosion, 
environmental degradation, fair trade and chronic poverty. This dimension of 
human security probably derives from international agreements on economic, 
social and cultural rights. Without question this is the most contentious and 
elusive dimension of human security. 
 
The persistence of falsehood and imperial delusions of order 
Human security requires institutionalised responses to  factors  that diminish 
human worth. The paradox here is that the state, supposedly a guarantor of 
human dignity, has been the most prolific destroyer of humanity. 68 
Governments of all ideological persuasions have been much more fatal to 
humanity than all natural tragedies combined. It has been estimated that over 
169 million people have been killed since the start of the 20th centur4 by 
both totalitarian and liberal-democratic governments across the world. 6 
It is therefore not surprising that the human rights regime is preoccupied 
with taming and reining in the feral proclivities of the state. As Makau wa 
Mutua observed in his seminal critique of the conception of the state as a 
predator: 
 
The human rights story presents the state as the classic savage, an ogre forever 
bent on the consumption of humans. The human rights corpus is ostensibly 
meant to contain the state, for the state is apparently the raison d'etre for the 
corpus. Although savagery in human rights discourse connotes much more 
than the state, the state is depicted as the operational instrument of savagery. 
States become savage when they choke off and oust civil society. The 'good' 
state controls its demonic proclivities by cleansing itself with, and internalizing, 
human rights. The 'evil' state, on the other hand, expresses itself through an 
illiberal, anti-democratic, or other authoritarian culture. The redemption or 
salvation of the state is solely dependent on its submission to human rights 
norms. The state is the guarantor of human rights; it is also the target and 
raison d'etre of human rights law.70 
 
The notion of the state as a feral predator finds loud and iterative voices in 
scholarly cogitations and institutional measures. 71 The statistics on state 
predation on humanity are monumental. 72 Given that the global South is often 
portrayed as the global epicentre for state brutality, 73 it follows that virtually all 
human rights organisations are focused on identifying and shaming the 'savages' 
of the global South. Notwithstanding egregious human rights abuses in all parts 
of the world, the global South is synonymous with human rights abuses. 
However, the narrative of the global South as a feral predator often 
overlooks the cultural foundations of modern postcolonial states. Again, as 
 
Makau wa Mutua presciently observes: 
 
While the metaphor (of the state as a predator) may suggest otherwise, it is not 
the state per se that is barbaric but the cultural foundation of the state. The 
state only becomes a vampire when 'bad' culture overcomes or disallows the 
development of 'good' culture. The real savage, though, is not the state but a 
cultural deviation from human rights. That savagery inheres in the theory and 
practice of the one-party state, military junta, controlled or closed state, 
theocracy . . . not in the state per se. The state itself is a neutral, passive 
instrumentality-a receptacle or an empty vessel-that conveys savagery by 
implementing the project of the savage culture . . .The human rights corpus, 
though well meaning, is fundamentally Eurocentric, and suffers from several 
basic and interdependent flaws captured in the Savage -Victim -Saviour 
metaphor. First, the corpus falls within the historical continuum of the 
Eurocentric colonial project, in which actors are cast into superior and 
subordinate positions. Precisely because of this cultural and historical context, 
the human rights movement's basic claim of universality is undermined. 
Instead, a historical understanding of the struggle for human dignity should 
locate the impetus of a universal conception of human rights in those societies 
subjected to European tyranny and imr,erialism. Unfortunately, this is not part 
of the official human rights narrative. 4 
 
The moral is that, if human security is to be realised, the instinctive 
demonisation of the global South must be replaced by a rational, transparent 
and effective assessment of the perverse foundations and contemporary decay 
of the postcolonial state itself. In particular, there must be a critical inquiry 
into the role of the 'civilised self in the processes that led to the present 
situation. This is a task that requires sensitivity to history, courageous 
confrontation with ugly facts, and the political will to make necessary 
amends. It is a task that must appreciate the inherent rights of peoples to 
organise themselves in accord with their resources, socioeconomic demands 
and spiritual world-view. A linear conception of history, with the global North 
as the touchstone of 'civilisation' and the rest of the world playing 'catch-up' 
is inconsistent with the concept of human security. Freedom is at the core 
of human security. As Makau wa Mutua has eloquently argued: 
 
The zeal to see all humanity as related and the impulse to help those defined as 
in need is noble . . . a certain degree of human universality is inevitable and 
desirable. But what that universality is, what historical and cultural stew it is 
made of, and how it is accomplished make all the difference . . . the [imperial] 
zeal to save others--even from themselves-is steeped in western and European 
history. If one culture is allowed the prerogative of imperialism, the right to 
define and impose on others what it deems f ood for humanity, the very 
meaning of freedom will have been abrogated.7 
 
Condescending claims, especially on the alleged inability of Africans, Arabs, 
Muslims, etc to 'rise above the centrifugal pull of tribalism' 76 must yield to a 
better understanding of the historical roots of human insecurity.77 The 
totalising imagery of 'ethnic groups', 'tribes' and 'pre-modern' peoples blinded 
 
by the lights of European modernisation, and hence unable to grope their 
way out of anarchic and failing states,78 is a rhetoric that obscures the 
structural pathologies of the postcolonial state. Retailers of this sanitised 
version of history ignore the 'ethnic' foundations of European states. 
The restructuring of the state may require redrawing the current boundary 
lines of some states in Africa79 and in Arabia, and the promotion of a regime 
of self-determination of peoples. Arguments for the perpetuation of the status 
quo, especially in egregious cases such as the Kurdish question, are 
irresponsible and mischievous. 80 A redrawing of boundaries is not always a 
terrible thing.81 The focus should be on how to peacefully reorganise the 
patchwork of colonially balkanised peoples to become 'geographic spaces of 
peace and prosperity'. 
Beyond restructuring flawed states of the global South, the foreign policies 
of states of the global North must be critically evaluated. In this regard both 
neoliberal fundamentalisms such as 'free markets' and riht-wing imperial 
delusions of the 'clash of civilizations' must be restrained. 8 For far too long 
millions of people in the global South have been massacred by proxies of the 
global North in the name of imposing democracy and a free market. 83 While 
neoliberal ideologues may extol the wonders of Kantian democratic peace, 
the fact of the matter is that many so-called democracies are implicated in the 
under-reported but lethal conflicts in the global South.84 From Vietnam 
to Nicaragua, and from Afghanistan to Iraq, various atrocities have been 
committed in the name of freedom and free markets. 85 The fundamentalism 
of Bin Laden may not be much different in thought patterns, prescriptions, 
moral certitude and totalising imagery as that of those who slaughter 
the innocents in the name of freedom.8"6 
Military victories by imperial powers in states of the global South87 sow 
the seeds of future tragedy. It was the Gulf war and the establishment of US 
military bases in Arabia that partly motivated and inspired Osama bin Laden 
to create the al-Qaeda network. In addition to the slaughter of innocents and 
the vicious cycles of violence created by imperial delusions of order, the 
environmental costs of imperial conquests are enormous. For example, in 
Afghanistan 88 the USA used between 500 and 1000 metric tons of depleted 
uranium in munitions to attack bunkers, caves and other hardened targets.89 
Perhaps the most virulent manifestation of the gladiatorial approach to 
security is the Bush Doctrine of 1 June 2002.90 The National Security 
Strategy (NSS) paper issued by the White House91 on 17 September 2002 
iterated the Bush Doctrine. The NSS asserts a US right to undertake 
preemptive attacks against potential aggressors, cutting off planned, 
perceived or future attacks before they can occur. The NSS contains no clear 
definition of what constitutes 'sufficient threat to [US] national security'. 
Thus, there is ample room for arbitrary implementation. As Henry 
Kissinger, a man not known for his deference to international law warned, 
'it cannot be in either the American national interest or the world's interest to 
develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of pre-emption 
against its own definition of threats to its security' .92  The Bush Doctrine 
repudiates multilateral approaches to both collective and human security 
and confirms the theory that the USA, and indeed other imperial Rowers, 
 
only pursues multilateralism and diplomacy when it is convenient for it.93 
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the Bush doctrine is imbued with neoliberal 
rhetoric on the rule of law, respect for private property, democracy, free 
markets, and so on.94 
Beyond such neoliberal pretensions the hypocrisy of imperial powers in 
matters of collective and human security, in and of itself, undermines human 
security.95 For example, the USA continues to support the decadent regime 
in Saudi Arabia and sustains many tyrants. The USA and other imperial 
states have been instrumental in spreading weapons of mass destruction.96 
The foreign policies of several powerful states of the global North are often 
indistinguishable from those of notorious rogue states.97 The USA98 is as 
guilty of international state terrorism (bombing of Sudan) and state-
sponsored terrorism (Contras in Nicaragua) as some of the notorious 
members of the so-called 'axis of evil'. 
Often imperial delusions of order are justified on the basis that the UN has 
become sclerotic.99 While it is generally accepted that the UN has failed or 
under-performed in several respects, neither the Bush Doctrine nor imperial 
delusions of order are acceptable. 100 The world would be in worse shape if 
the UN did not exist. Recent statistics unveiled by Human Security Centre in 
2005 show that, since 1992, the number of armed conflicts has dropped by 
40%. This unheralded decline is linked to a dramatic increase in UN conflict 
prevention and peace building efforts. 101 
Confounding conventional wisdom, the report reveals that all forms of 
political violence, except international terrorism, have declined world-wide 
since the early 1990s. The reduction in the number of conflicts is attributable 
to the critical role played by the UN in spearheading a huge upsurge of 
international conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building activities. 
There is still much work to be done, however. Crises cannot be the main 
criteria for evaluating the adequacy or lack thereof of institutions designed 
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